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Pitfalls for Price Competitors: State
and Federal Restrictions on Below Cost
or Unreasonably Low Prices
Carl F. LaRue
Although the value of vigorous price competition is a basic tenet of
antitrust policy, it is increasingly clear that extremely low prices are
not without legal risk, even if freely given to all buyers. In recent years,
the United States Supreme Court has twice considered aspects of sales
below cost: first under a state statute,' and then under the "unreasonably
low price" dause of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.? Two or
three cases involving sales below cost reach the highest state courts each
year, and activity in the state
legislatures, opinions of the at-
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Harvard College, LLB., torneys general, and increased
University of Michigan) is a practicing attorney enforcement efforts in some
in Toledo, Ohio. He belongs to the Toledo, jurisdictions' reflect a continu-
Ohio and American Bar Associations. ing pressure for restrictions on
sales below cost. Severe fed-
eral legislation was proposed
in a recent Congress." In addition, the spokesmen for small business
regularly and vehemently assert that predatory pricing, generally, and
selling below cost, in particular, are a major threat to the survival of
small enterprises.5 Last year the Federal Trade Commission announced
an investigation into pricing practices in the milk industry, noting that
below cost prices, among other "unfair acts, had come to its attention.
Prohibitions on selling below cost continue to appear in trade practice
rules,' and restrictions on unreasonably low prices appear from time
1. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
2. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
3. In recent years, numerous cases have been filed in Minnesota by the state, two of which
reached the state supreme court.
4. H.R. 10235, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
5. See, e.g., the hearings on proposed amendments to § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act
(Hearings on H.R. 10235 Before A Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)). See also Hearings on H.R. 3669 Before a
Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963) (Quality Stabilization Act) (particularly in regard to loss leaders), and the
report of that committee, H.R. REP. No. 566, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1963).
6. FTC Resolution, 27 Fed. Reg. 6682 (1962). Earlier, the problems of the dairy industry
were investigated extensively in various Congressional hearings in which complaints of preda-
tory pricing were frequent. See, e.g., Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee of the House
Select Committee on Small Business, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) ("Price Discrimination in
Dairy Products").
7. See, e.g., Rules for the Slide Fastener Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 193, 193.3 (1960).
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to time in consent decrees.' These and other similar developments9 in-
dicate the persistence and vitality of the conviction that selling below
cost or at "unreasonably" low prices is a serious problem which requires
some sort of governmental action.
At the present time, the state statutes against selling below cost and
the unreasonably low price clause of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act ° may not be subjects of frequent consideration, even for the special-
ist in trade regulation law." A general knowledge of present law, how-
ever, is important for those counseling businessmen on price decisions.
Furthermore, proposals for increased enforcement or new legislation
should be watched carefully. The discount revolution in retailing,
rapidly changing technology, modern advertising techniques and media,
highly mobile shoppers, and the influx of low-priced foreign goods may
lead to prices which are dangerously low under present legislation. At
the same time, these forces cause further demands for more stringent
state and federal laws and more vigorous enforcement. Moreover, de-
feat of the proposed "quality stabilization" act or its practical ineffective-
ness12 may result in its supporters putting their experience and resources
behind such demands.'8
8. See, e.g., United States v. Western Newspaper Union, TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade
Cas.) 5 69709, at 76788 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Reportedly, a major issue in settling the civil
aspect of the electrical equipment cases was the government's effort to obtain an injunction
against unreasonably low prices. 19 BNA ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-9 (Nov. 21,
1961). Most of the consent decrees contain no such restriction. See, e.g., United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70487, at 76978 (E.D.
Pa. 1962); United States v. General Elec. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70488,
at 76984 (E.D. Pa. 1962). An earlier decree, however, does prohibit unreasonably low
prices. United States v. Foster-Wheeler Corp. (C.H. Wheeler Mfg. Co.), TRADE REG. REP.
(1961 Trade Cas.) 5 70035, at 78121 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
9. In the continual congressional hearings on the problems of small business and related
matters in recent years, complaints of selling below cost, use of loss leaders, and predatory
practices generally have appeared regularly. In addition to those already cited, see Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 85th Cong, 2d
Sess. (1958) ("Competitive Impact of Discount-House Operations on Small Business" and
"The Role of Private Antitrust Enforcement in Protecting Small Business"). See also Hear-
ings Before a Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963) ('The Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and Related Ver-
tical Integration").
10. 49 Stat. 1528 (1963), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958).
11. This is so particularly in Ohio, where there is no sale below cost act of general applica-
tion. The original Ohio "Unfair Cigarette Sales Act," OHIO GEN. CODE 5§ 6402-11 to 20
(1941), was held unconstitutional in Setter v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 74 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio
C.P. 1946), aff'd, 74 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947), aff'd, 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d
91 (1947) on the ground that it failed to recognize cost differentials between "service" and
"cash and carry" wholesalers. The act was subsequently amended in various particulars, but
has not yet been tested constitutionally in its present form (OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1333.11-.21).
See State v. Thiemann Bros., 91 Ohio L. Abs. 345 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
12. Weston, Fair Trade, Alias "Quality Stabilization": Status, Problems and Prospects, 22
A.B.A. ANTITRusT SECTION REP. 76 (1963), notes in detail the legal and practical objec-
tions to the proposed legislation.
13. Many of the state acts provide statutory markups to cover the cost of doing business
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The following review covers the current status of the state laws and
the unreasonably low price clause of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act in the light of the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Na-
tional Dairy Products Corp.4 Coverage of both state and federal law
necessitates a rather general treatment, particularly in regard to the nu-
merous and varied state acts. However, a broad review of the hazards
of extremely low prices, apart from questions of discrimination in price
- which are covered by other portions of section 3 as well as section 2
of the Robinson-Patman Act and a number of state acts - may be useful
to the lawyer faced with a problem in this area.
THE STATE STATUTES
In General
Of the thirty state statutes prohibiting sales below cost, nineteen
apply only to such sales by retailers and wholesalers. 5 Similar acts deal-
ing only with particular types of merchandise, chiefly dairy and tobacco
products, have been enacted in many of the same states and several other
states as well.'"
which must be applied in the absence of proof of a lower cost. In view of the difficulty of
proving a lower cost, strict enforcement of these acts could have much the same effect as re-
sale price maintenance legislation.
14. 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
15. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5§ 44-1461 to -1466 (1956); ARK STAT. 5 70-301 to -314
(1947); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17000-101; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-2-1 to
-17 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 42-111 to -115 (1962); HAWAII REV. LAws 5§
205-1 to -13 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-401 to -413 (1948); KY. REV. STAT. §§
365.030-.070, .990 (1959); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 51:421 to :427 (1950); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 93, §5 14E-K (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, 55 111-15 (1957); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 184, § 1-7 (1954); MmN. STAT. ANN. 5 325.01-.07, .48, .49, .52 (1961);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-101 to -118 (1947); N.D. REV. CODE §5 51-10-01 to -08
(1960); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1201 to -1206 (1943); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 358:1-:5
(1955); N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:4-7 to -14 (1940); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-.11 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT. S 646.100-.180, 990 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 211-17 (1953);
R.L GEN. LAws ANN. 55 6-13-1 to -8 (1956); S.C. CODE § 66-65 (1962); TENN. CODE
ANN. SS 69-109 to -110, -301 to -306 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. §5 13-5-1 to -18 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. S 59-9 to -19-1 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 19.90.010 -.920
(1939); W. VA. CODE § 4 678(8a)-(8n) (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100.30 (1961);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-24 to -33 (1957). [Hereinafter reference to the acts will be by state
name only.) These acts, including recent amendments, are reported in the compilation of state
laws in 4 TRADE 1RG. REP. 35 30000 -35530. Of the foregoing, only the acts of Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming apply to manufacturers. The Utah act originally was applicable to all
levels, but was amended in 1955 to apply only to wholesalers and retailers. However, some
references to "production" and "manufacturers" remain. The statutes of South Carolina and
Tennessee (which has a separate provision applicable only to manufacturers, as well as the
usual type of act applicable to wholesalers and retailers) lack many of the details discussed
below and are not typical of the class of acts covering manufacturers.
16. Other products covered by special acts are alcoholic beverages, drugs and cosmetics,
petroleum products, bakery products, and agricultural products. The number and variety of
the special acts precludes full citation and analysis in this article. In general, the analysis
below is applicable to the special acts, and cases arising under the special acts are cited wher-
19631
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The individual acts within each of the two basic categories of below
cost acts (i.e., those applying only to the distributive trades, and those
of general application) have many features in common. But there is
also a good deal of cross-breeding between the strains, and nearly all of
the acts have peculiarities of their own. Thus, while particular phrases,
sentences, and sections appear again and again, the individual acts often
contain departures from the pattern which may materially affect their
coverage, application to particular facts, or constitutional validity. More-
over this crazy-quilt of legislatfon is constantly changed by amendments
and interpretations which reflect the continuing political and legal
struggle over the acts. Nonetheless, many similarities remain. A brief
summary of the usual features of these statutes will provide a framework
for consideration of the discussion which follows.
Generally, the two basic elements of an offense under the state acts
are the sale below cost and the intent to injure competition or competi-
tors. In the acts applying only to distributive businesses, proof of the
sale below cost is aided by a statutory markup (a percentage of the
lower of invoice or replacement cost, less discounts, plus freight) which
must be included to cover the cost of doing business unless a lower cost
can be shown. The acts of general application usually itemize the
elements of cost to be included. A number of states permit proof of
effect on competition or competitors in lieu of intent. When intent is
required, a presumption of illegal intent upon proof of the sale below
cost is frequently provided. Several of the acts cover "loss leaders" by
describing illegal intent or effect in terms of "inducing the purchase of
other merchandise" or the "tendency to deceive" purchasers. Offenders
are subject to criminal prosecutions or civil damage actions. Injunction
proceedings also usually are available to "any person," often without
regard to actual or threatened damage. Treble damages are recoverable
in several states.17
Scope of Coverage
The most important restriction on the coverage of the state laws is
the limitation to the distributive trades contained in nearly two-thirds of
the acts.'" Selling at retail is almost always defined as selling to put-
ever they are pertinent. Where there are both general and special acts, the latter are con-
sidered controlling, particularly when subsequently enacted. Henderson v. Hogue, TRADE
REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 5 68462, at 71933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).
17. The sale below cost acts have generated a substantial body of literature. 1 CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETmON AND TRADE MARKs § 27 (2d ed. 1950), and Clark, Stautory Re-
strictions on Selling Below Cost, 11 VAND. L. REv. 105 (1957) consider state laws generally;
and Annot., 118 A.L.R. 506 (1939) and Annot., 128 A.L.R. 1126 (1940) review many of
the principal cases on the subject. Other studies of particular aspects of the acts are noted
below.
18. See note 15 supra.
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chasers "for consumption or use other than resale or further processing
or manufacturing"; and selling at wholesale is defined as selling "for the
purpose of resale or further processing or manufacturing" by the buyer.1"
Anyone "in the business of making sales" at retail or wholesale is a "re-
tailer" or "wholesaler."
20
Selling at wholesale, if literally construed, is so broadly defined as
to cover even a manufacturer's industrial sales or sales to wholesalers.
Such an approach would, of course, render the apparent limitation of the
acts to wholesalers and retailers meaningless. A better view is that the
acts, considered as a whole, contemplate only the traditional forms of
distributive businesses, and that the breadth of the definition of selling at
wholesale was intended only to prevent evasions and insure that all types
of sales by wholesalers were covered. Even in the case of a manufacturer
dearly selling as a wholesaler and retailer, this type of act has been held
inapplicable due to the lack of cost criteria appropriate for a manufac-
turer.2 However, the acts do specifically cover distribution businesses
which sell at both retail and wholesale, providing that the sale in ques-
tion is to be treated in accordance with the statutory provisions for the
level at which it was made2
Service trades are expressly covered by most of the acts applying to
sales, regardless of functional level 3 The acts limited to wholesalers
and retailers do not include services, and the cost computations and pre-
sumptions based on invoice or replacement cost which this type of statute
employs would be difficult to adapt to service businesses.
A few of the acts exempt certain types of business.2 4 The Kansas act
19. Some elaboration or variation is contained in the Minnesota and North Dakota acts.
Acts which apply to manufacturers do not define the different levels, although the definitions
of cost distinguish distributive businesses from producers. Tennessee defines wholesalers more
narrowly. Oregon's definitions apply only to wholesalers and retailers in "food commerce."
20. Of the acts applying only to distribution, all but Utah define retailers or wholesalers in
this manner. The Pennsylvania act apparently does not cover a manufacturer selling at retail
so long as it is "not operating a retail business or trade..... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, S
212(6) (1953). Taken literally, a manufacturer operating a wholesale business would not
be covered, but the wording of § 212(7) may be inadvertent. Nebraska and Louisiana spe-
cifically exempt sales by manufacturers (or processors in Nebraska) from the act entirely.
21. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 153 Me. 265, 136 A.2d 542 (1957).
The Maine statute was, in fact, even more specific, referring in § 1 VIII to "a retailer (who]
sells at retail any merchandise which is the product of his or its own manufacture . M.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 184, § 1 VIII (1954).
22. Of the distribution acts, only Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, and Tennessee lack an express
provision to this effect. Cf. Hawaii. Several acts also cover "direct buyers,' i.e., retailers who
buy from manufacturers but do not sell at wholesale. These acts are discussed below in con-
nection with the problems of cost analysis.
23. Of the acts of general application, only South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming do not
cover services. Cf. provisions dealing with services to personalty in Hawaii, Montana, Utah,
and Wyoming, appearing in their exemption sections.
24. Motion picture licenses and utility rates are exempted in California, Colorado, Hawaii
(motion pictures only), Kentucky, and Washington. Fertilizer companies and those buying
from them for resale are exempt in Virginia. Connecticut (as amended in 1963) exempts
petroleum products; and special provisions for certain products occasionally are included in
1963]
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recently was held unconstitutional in its entirety because of its "arbitrary"
exemption of grain and feed dealers.2" Although there is earlier author-
ity to the contrary, this decision may lead to similar challenges to other
acts with such exclusions.26
Nearly all of the acts exempt certain types of transactions, but there
is substantial variation from state to state. Sales for charitable purposes;
clearance sales; liquidation or close-out sales; sales of damaged, deterio-
rated, or perishable goods; sales pursuant to court order; and sales to the
government or government agencies are the transactions most frequently
exempted.2" Accommodation sales, "isolated transactions" not in the
ordinary course of business, and a few other exemptions appear in some
of the acts.2"
The state statutes cover advertisements or offers of sale as well as
sales and usually cover conditional sales expressly. 9 Gifts also are in-
cluded in a number of jurisdictions. 0 The effect, of course, is to make
the general acts rather than in separate special acts. Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode Island
include such provisions.
25. State v. Consumers Warehouse Mkt., 185 Kan. 363, 343 P.2d 234 (1959). The Kansas
act was repealed in 1961. KAN. LAws 1961, ch. 236, at 573.
26. Contra, State v. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940), where the statute ex-
empted the licensing of motion picture films. The court did not consider that the class created
was arbitrary or unreasonable and noted the "wide measure of discretion" open to the legis-
lature. The same question may arise in regard to the validity of the special acts. In San
Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 156 Tex. 574, 297 S.W.2d 813 (1957), an act
limited to sales made by "grocery stores," regardless of the type of goods sold, was found
unconstitutional because of lack of relationship between the purpose of the act and the class
to which it applied. The Missouri and Louisiana milk acts, however, recently have been up-
held in Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962) and Schwegmann Bros. Giant
Super Mkts. v. McCory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 114 (1959).
The New Jersey Gasoline Act was sustained in Fried v. Kervick, 34 N.J. 68, 167 A.2d 380
(1961). Where there is a background of severe price wars or other special facts and the act
applies to all in the industry, an attack based on unreasonable and discriminatory application
may fail. However, the arbitrary exclusion of certain businesses from the general acts presents
a stronger case.
27. For example, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, and others include all these
exemptions; and some form of exemption for liquidation or clearance sales and sales of dam-
aged, deteriorated, or perishable goods appears in nearly all. These exemptions usually
require that clearance sales and the like be advertised, marked, and sold as such. Occasionally
the acts are more elaborate in this respect, see, e.g., California and Oregon. Only the Idaho,
and North Dakota acts expressly provide that the burden is upon the defendant to prove
such exemptions. Selling below cost to meet competition is included among these exemp-
tions, but is discussed separately below.
28. "Isolated transactions" are exempt in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee. Accommodation sales are exempt in Virginia, bona fide auction sales
in Oklahoma, and sales of tools to employees in Pennsylvania.
29. Of the acts applying only to wholesalers and retailers, all but Louisiana, Minnesota, and
Utah expressly cover conditional sales. The acts applicable to manufacturers do not do so.
30. The acts of general application all cover gifts; also, the Minnesota, North Dakota, and
West Virginia acts apply only to distribution. In United Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Harrison's
Sons, 89 Pa. D.&C. 294 (C.P. 1953), the court held that a gift of 5 lbs. of sugar with
purchases of $7.99 or more was not a violation. Pennsylvania did not prohibit gifts as such,
and the use of gifts to stimulate business was not considered a subterfuge to evade the act.
Several of the acts specifically cover evasion by means of any scheme of special rebates, col-
[VoL. 15:35
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gifts illegal if the other requirements of the act are met, since the gift will
inevitably be below cost. There also are specific provisions for combina-
tion sales, i.e., where more than one item is covered by a combined price
or one item is "given" with another. These provisions are rather am-
biguous, but have been interpreted as requiring that the price cover the
total cost of the items included.3 While the requirement of predatory
purpose or anticompetitive effect may insulate gifts or promotional deals
of small value or those not conditioned on purchases of other goods, 2
substantial promotional arrangements directly tied to purchases are more
likely to be challenged, particularly under the statutes which do not re-
quire proof of predatory intent."
Many cases hold that trading stamps--do not have to be treated as a
price reduction. In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers
-Ass'n,"4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the value of the stamps
did not have to be deducted from a price which then would have been
below cost. Safeway could not meet its competitor's use of stamps by an
offsetting price cut equivalent to the value of the stamps.5 On appeal,
lateral contracts, and the like. See, e.g., the California, Minnesota, and Washington acts.
Idaho added such a provision in 1963.
31. State v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 26 N.W.2d 647 (1947); United Retail Grocers
Ass'n v. Harrison's Sons, supra note 30. Of the distribution acts, only Minnesota, New Jersey,
South Carolina, and West Virginia lack such provisions. Colorado requires that the price cover
the total cost of all items. Utah and Wisconsin (under amendments subsequent to the Tankar
Gas Inc. case) require separate treatment only if "individually" sold, otherwise requiring
that the price cover the aggregate cost. Louisiana requires that the cost of services in connection
with the sale of goods to purchasers must be considered a reduction in price.
32. Miller's Groceteria Co. v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 113, 109 P.2d 637 (1941).
In Washington, the Attorney General ruled that "welcome wagon" gifts were not a violation.
55-57 Ops. AT'rY GEN. 83 (Wash. 1955). See also the following attorneys general opinions:
TRADE REG. REP. (1953 Trade Cas.) 5 67589, at 68875 (Ky. 1953); TRADE REG. REP.
(1940-43 Trade Cas.) 5 56213, at 767 (Cal. 1942); Id. 5 56008, at 31 (Earl Warren).
TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 9 68065, at 70443 (Wash. 1955).
33. In Robinson v. Hayes, TRADE REG. REP. (1950-51 Trade Cas.) S 62781, at 64311
(Tenn. Cr. App. 1951), a lottery type of promotion known as a "suit club" was struck down
because particular sales were below cost even though the plan as a whole was highly profitable.
Contra, Eckdahl v. Hurwitz, 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940).
Temporary injunctions were granted against give-away promotions of one sort or another
under the Minnesota act, but the more stringent standard of effect required in State v. Apple-
baum's Food Mkts., Inc., 259 Minn. 209, 106 N.W.2d 896 (1960) (which involved prizes
and bonus stamps, etc.) may require a different approach in future cases there. The Apple-
baumes case is considered further below.
34. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957),
a&d, 360 U.S. 334 (1959). See also Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104
A.2d 310 (1954); Trade Comm'n v. Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953); Annot.,
70 A.LR.2d 1080 (1960). But see Hogue v. Kroger Co., 210 Tenn. 1, 356 S.W.2d 267
(1962) (where the contrary conclusion was reached under a statute containing more specific
language). There is a division of authority on this question under the fair trade acts. Jantzen
v. Korvette, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1212 (1952).
The meeting competition and computation of cost aspects of trading stamps are considered
ivira.
35. "Cash" discounts, apart from trading stamps, have received little consideration. They,
of course, would have to be treated as such on the books and limited to cash transactions.
Price tags and advertising would have to reflect the full price. Even if such procedures are
19631
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the United States Supreme Court upheld this ruling, concluding that the
state could distinguish constitutionally between the use of stamps and
price cutting. Since the statute in question was aimed at loss leader prac-
tices, and the stamps were given only on total purchases rather than se-
lectively, the Court affirmed its validity. Safeway's only recourse to
match its competitor was to give stamps, which it started doing during
the course of the litigation.36 However, assuming that other elements of
a violation are present, giving large quantities of "bonus" stamps might
fall outside the Safeway interpretation, particularly if extra stamps are
given on particular items."
Computation of Cost
Under the acts limited to wholesale and retail businesses, the cost
base is the lower of invoice or replacement cost, after trade discounts,
plus freight and cartage. A certain percentage of this base then must
be added to cover the cost of doing business.38 These statutory markups
vary from 4% to 12% for retailers (most are around 6%), but are uni-
formly 2% for wholesalers.39 In Minnesota, however, sales above a
15 % markup are conclusively legal.
Since there is no comparable cost base for producers, the group of
acts which prohibit sales below cost regardless of functional level usually
define costs separately for production and distribution. Included in pro-
duction are raw materials, labor, and overhead; and for distribution,
the lower of invoice or replacement cost plus the "cost of doing busi-
ness" must be taken into account. Both the "cost of doing business"
and "overhead" are then further defined as including, without limitation,
carefully observed, adoption of cash discounts by businesses formerly operating on an exclu-
sively cash basis might well be considered a sham, as would discounts in excess of amounts
customary in the trade.
36. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334, 339 n.3 (1959).
37. Safeway's use of stamps to meet a competitor's use of stamps was limited to 3% by the
Oklahoma court. Id. at 339. Giving bonus stamps and discount coupons was attacked in
State v. Applebaum's Food Mkts., 259 Minn. 209, 106 N.W.2d 896 (1960), but the court
found the evidence of intent or effect insufficient. See also TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade
Cas.) 5 68100, at 70569 (Idaho Att'y Gen. Op. 1955); Trade Comm'n v. Bush, 123 Utah
302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953).
38. Of the distribution statutes, only New Jersey and North Dakota are without such pro-
visions, but a few other states do not use the presumptions for wholesalers. Cartage also is
subject to a presumption, usually .75%. Some of these acts provide that the manufacturer's
list, less discount, is prima facie evidence of invoice or replacement cost. See Idaho, Min-
nesota, and North Dakota acts.
39. As to retailers, Pennsylvania (4%) and Arizona (12%) represent the extremes. Penn-
sylvania does not permit invoice cost to be reduced by advertising allowances or the like. Cost
presumptions have been found invalid on constitutional grounds in some circumstances. See
Cohen v. Frey & Sons, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951); Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 148
Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947). Contra, Fredericks v. Burnquist, 207 Minn. 590, 292
N.W. 420 (1940); McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940). However,
the controversy has more often centered on the presumptions of intent. See note 58 inIra.
[VoL 15:35
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a number of specific items, e.g., labor (including executive salaries), rent,
depreciation, selling expense, maintenance of equipment, interest on bor-
rowed capital, delivery expense, credit losses, licenses, taxes, insurance,
and advertising." Acts of this type ordinarily do not employ markup
percentages,"' but nearly all such acts include provisions for the admissi-
bility of cost surveys so long as they are "established" and limited to the
"locality" of the alleged sale below cost 2
Most of the acts expressly provide that cash discounts on purchases
may not be used to reduce the costs to the buyer.43 However, a seller
must include the cost of trading stamps or cash discounts as a cost of
doing business."
The limitation to "bona fide" costs has created constitutional problems
for some of these acts. In most of the acts, an effort is made to exclude
from cost computations the cost of merchandise purchased at forced sales
40. South Carolina and Tennessee do not list the items of cost, and the Oregon act adds
some items to the usual list. Otherwise this group of acts is fairly uniform in this respect.
The joint definition of "cost of doing business" and "overhead" results in double treatment of
labor, since labor already is included as a cost of production independent of "overhead." The
listing of cost elements is similar to that of the Trade Practice Rules for the Slide Fastener In-
dustry, 16 C.F.R. § 193, 193.3 (1960). There, however, the cost of borrowing is expressly
excluded.
41. Hawaii has a 6% markup for "distributors"; Oregon has a 6% markup for retailers in
food commerce. California uses a 6% presumption for the cost of doing business in dis-
tribution and also provides presumptions for specific elements of cost, i.e., evidence of pub-
lished tariffs, prevailing wage rates, and the prevailing market price of raw materials will be
presumptive evidence of the cost of those items. Moreover, the cost of wages must be charged
at the prevailing rate even if actually lower. A similar provision in the Washington act was
held valid in State v. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940).
42. The Tennessee and South Carolina acts, and all acts limited to distribution, except Utah,
lack such provisions. Utah expressly provides that such surveys are prima fade evidence of
cost. It is the only act which does so, though Minnesota formerly had such a provision. It
was declared unconstitutional in Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn.
1938). See also Civic Ass'n v. Railway Motor Fuels, Inc., 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236
(1941), which discusses at length the problem of adequate survey techniques. The price-
fixing use of surveys is discused in Comment, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price
Fixing Under State Law, 57 YALE UJ. 391, 413 (1948). [Hereinafter cited as Comment,
57 YALE I-. 391 (1948.)]
43. The Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington,
and Wyoming acts make no provision with regard to cash discounts. Contrary to the gen-
eral approach, North Dakota expressly provides that cash discounts are to be used to reduce
the buyer's cost, and the same conclusion might be reached in the absence of express provision.
People v. Lucky Stores, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1950 Trade Cas.) 5 62623, at 63814 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1950). The refusal to recognize cash discounts as a reduction of cost may be in-
valid constitutionally where the effect is discriminatory. Cohen v. Frey & Sons, 197 Md.
586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951); Setter v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91
(1947).
44. TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade Cas.) 5 68100, at 70569 (Idaho Att'y Gen. Op. 1955).
Trade Comm'n v. Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953). This approach would make
little practical difference, since proof of actual cost is seldom attempted, and trading stamps
or cash discounts would be a cost of doing business within the markup fixed by the statute.
The Utah act was amended in 1955 to require that cash discounts, including trading stamps,
be considered a reduction in selling price, but the act still provides that cash discounts cannot
be used to reduce the cost to the buyer.
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such as bankruptcy, liquidation sales, closeouts, etc.45 Some acts, how-
ever, only describe such costs as those "which cannot be justified by pre-
vailing market conditions." This type of wording has been found un-
constitutionally vague.46
While acts limited to sales at wholesale or retail may be inapplicable
to vertically integrated manufacturers," they do cover concerns combin-
ing wholesale and retail functions. Occasionally they also contain ex-
press provisions for "direct buyers," i.e., retailers who purchase from man-
ufacturers but do not sell at wholesale. The acts which apply generally,
regardless of functional level, would, of course, apply to manufacturers
selling at wholesale and retail. Problems of cost computation are pre-
sented under either type of act.
If there are sales at both wholesale and retail, the distribution acts
usually provide that the sale in question is to be treated in accordance
with the statutory provisions applicable to the level at which it is made.
Thus, only the statutory markup for that functional level would be ap-
plied, and a retail sale would carry only the retail markup, even if bought
at a wholesaler's price and quantity. However, if proof of actual costs
were attempted, it would seem that a retail sale should bear a proportion-
ate part of the cost of wholesale functions performed in connection with
the goods sold at retail. Where the acts provide for "direct buyers,"
statutory markups for retail and wholesale must be aggregated."8 Pre-
sumably, actual costs for all functions performed in connection with the
sale, regardless of whether retail or wholesale in nature, also would be
aggregated.
The acts of general application presumably require proof of all costs
attributable to the sale in question. Nevertheless, it is often asserted that
vertically integrated companies "subsidize" their distribution operations
out of profits from manufacturing. Hence, it may be argued that
45. Only Maryland, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina lack some such pro-
vision.
46. State v. Consumers Warehouse Mkt. Inc., 183 Kan. 502, 329 P.2d 638 (1958), and
cases cited therein; Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1949). The Oklahoma statute
was subsequently amended. Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin have similar provisions.
47. See note 21 supra.
48. This approach is taken in Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Ohio Unfair Cigarette Sales Act contains
a direct buyer provision of this general type. OmIo Rxv. CODE § 1333.11 (D). Massa-
chusetts and Rhode Island, and New Jersey have unclear provisions which may be meant to
produce the same result, although their wording suggests treating the wholesale operations
separately even though there are no sales at wholesale. Maine and New Hampshire expressly
refer to manufacturers selling at retail. But see note 21 supra. The acts with provisions
covering direct buyers usually contain provisions for those selling at both wholesale and retail
as well. See note 22 supra and text thereto. This is so despite the result of charging a "direct
buying" retailer with both markups while charging only the retail markup to the retail sales
of a concern which also sells at wholesale.
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each functional level should be considered independently." Where sales
to others are made at each level, the prices charged on outside sales might
be used as the cost to the next lower level on internal transactions. But
to do so would neglect the cost savings in handling, selling, or otherwise
afforded by integration of functions.5" Internal cost figures on trans-
actions between different functional levels of the same company also may
be misleading, since they are likely to be based on standard costs devel-
oped over a period of time. Although useful to management, they may
not reflect actual costs of particular functions accurately.51 Full analysis
of the costs attributable to the sales of an integrated business may be com-
plex and difficult. However, there is no basis in the statutes for artifi-
cially compartmentalizing the costs of individual functions, and such an
approach is likely to prove unrealistic and inaccurate in practice.
In any event, taken as a whole, the provisions for computation of
costs have been of little practical value. Furthermore, this situation
seems likely to continue.52 Except in such extreme situations as sales
below invoice cost, businessmen are unlikely to have adequate cost in-
formation available, even if the statutes precisely defined relevant costs
and the time in which they are to be measured."3 Thus, in most situations
49. Utah expressly provides that each activity be regarded as separate and distinct for cost
purposes, but gives no guidance as to how the costs are to be determined. Wisconsin provides
(in addition to the usual "direct buyer" provision) that manufacturers who themselves retail
and also sell to other retailers shall be considered "retailers" under the act, and the price to
other retailers shall be used for purposes of computing cost to the manufacturer's retail stores.
50. Nonetheless, some companies engaged in dual distribution charge the same price to
their own distribution operations as to outsiders. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4
of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 89, 310 (1963)
(The Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and Related Vertical Integration).
51. Birrell, The Integrated Company and The Price Squeeze Under the Sherman Act and
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as Amended, 9 A.B.A. AN'rrRusT SECrION REP. 50, 57
(1956) discusses the accounting problems which arise. See also note 119 infra. The proposed
"dual distribution" legislation would require that internal transactions between different "es-
tablishments" of the same company be treated as sales and made subject to § 2 of the Robinson-
Patman Act. S. 1107, H.R. 3562, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
52. Attempts to prove actual costs lower than the statutory markups are rare and have met
with little success. See Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).
In Cohen v. Frey & Son, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951), the defendant's cost analysis
was found defective in some particulars, but the court refused to disregard it entirely. The
cost justification defense under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Star. 1528 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), which has been described as "largely illusory in practice" in AT'Y
GEir. NAT'L Comm. ANTrIsT REP. 171 (1955), offers little encouragement to those con-
templating litigation over questions of cost.
53. A few statutes do provide a period for the analysis of cost. See the California, Min-
nesota, Oregon, and Washington acts. In State v. Fleming Co., 184 Kan. 674, 339 P.2d 12
(1959), the absence of such provision was among the features which the court found consti-
tutionally objectionable. The opinion in Borden v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962)
summarizes the testimony of Borden's manager and Professor Taggart of the University of
Michigan as to the impossibility of knowing the exact costs. However, the court concluded
that a "reasonable" construction of the act, based upon average costs during a reasonable
period, would be possible. They noted that the statute, unlike that involved in the Fleming
case, was civil in nature. See also note 138 infra, regarding the difficulites of proving the
cost of small businesses.
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counsel is forced to view any questionable price in this area as a below
cost price, particularly if markup presumptions are provided by the rele-
vant statute.
Intent and Effect
Outright prohibitions of sales below cost regardless of intent or effect
have been held invalid on constitutional grounds. 4 The courts are di-
vided, however, on the validity of acts which require either intent or ef-
fect.5" The presumptions designed to facilitate proof of intent or effect5"
also have run into serious constitutional problems. The reasons given
for constitutional invalidity are lack of a rational connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed or the effect of removing the presump-
tion of innocence in criminal cases." There is, however, a division of
authorities on this matter, and the question remains unsettled in many
jurisdictions.5 8
54. See Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940). The Pennsylvania act was
subsequently revised, but the New Jersey act is unchanged. But see May's Drug Stores, Inc.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa 319, 45 N.W.2d 245 (1950) (upholding Iowa Unfair Cig-
arette Sales Act which required neither intent nor effect, but distinguishing the Zasloff and
Packard-Bamberger & Co. cases as involving general acts).
55. Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1949) held that the absence of a requirement
of intent rendered the Oklahoma act unconstitutional. However, the act was later amended to
require intent. See Adwon v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 228 P.2d 376 (Okla. 1951).
The Nebraska act was found invalid when it required only effect. State ex rel. English v.
Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N.W. 607 (1938). The Oregon act, which formerly required
only effect, never was tested. In 1963, the act was amended to require intent instead of effect.
The Nebraska act was later amended to require intent or effect, but in Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb.
653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949), this language was interpreted as requiring intent in all cases.
See also State v. Walgreen, 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650 (1941). Contra, McElhone v. Geror,
207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940); Borden v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962);
McIntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.2d 471 (1948).
56. There is considerable variety in approach. In Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Oklahoma (for civil actions only), Rhode Island, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin, the sale below cost alone raises the presumption. The California, Hawaii,
Minnesota, and Washington acts require a showing of effect as well. Arizona, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee require proof of a sale "in contravention of the policy" of
the act to make a prima facie case of violation. In State v. 20th Century Mkr., 236 Wis. 215,
294 N.W. 873 (1940), the court required proof of intent under such a provision. The
Wisconsin act later was amended to require only the sale below cost. After presumptions
based on the sale alone were declared unconstitutional, Connecticut and Maine now require
a showing of repeated sales below cost before the presumption arises. California (by amend-
ment in 1961) and Oregon (by amendment in 1963) provide a presumption of intent applica-
ble only to retailers upon proof of a sale below cost and limitation of the quantity offered.
57. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938); Mott's Super Mkt.,
Inc. v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961); Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 151
Me. 400, 120 A.2d 289 (1956). The Minnesota act later was amended and upheld in Mc-
Elhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940).
58. Such presumptions were upheld in People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153
P.2d 9 (1944); Mclntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.2d 471 (1948); State v. Ross,
259 Wis. 379, 48 N.W.2d 460 (1951). Similar provisions under acts limited to particular
products were upheld in Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112
So. 2d 606, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 114 (1959); Rocky Mt. Wholesale Co. v. Ponca
Wholesale Mercantile Co., 68 N.M.2d 228, 360 P.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 31
(1961); Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962).
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Where presumptions are lacking or when rebuttal evidence is of-
fered, acute problems of interpretation remain because of the difficulty
in distinguishing normal competitive intent or effect from conduct made
illegal by the statutes. The two most common types of statutes are those
which require the intent or purpose of "injuring competitors" and those
which require "the intent or effect of inducing the purchase of other mer-
chandise or unfairly diverting trade from a competitor.""
An intent to injure competitors or "unfairly" divert trade from them
is not readily distinguishable from an intent merely to win increased busi-
ness. Generally, the cases have held that "specific" intent is required,6"
but it is not yet dear what this means in practical realities. It may be
enough for the defendant to show that his motive was merely to promote
his own business6 or that the sale below cost was simply a mistake;6  but
his case will be stronger if he can show a background of prior losses of
business6" or the presence of a "legitimate commercial objective" apart
from the desire to increase business."
The required effect on competitors is equally unclear. A recent Min-
nesota Supreme Court decision held that affidavits by competitors stating
generally their conclusion that they had suffered business losses during
the period in question were insufficient to establish illegal effect." A
more stringent approach is reflected in the vigorous dissent by the then
Justice Loevinger. He argued that the evidence was ample, particularly
since mere threatened injury was sufficient to support a motion for
temporary injunction. Moreover, the act required only intent or effect,
and the dissent argued that intent could be inferred from the sale below
cost.
'Where the requirement of effect is described only as "unfairly" to
59. Arizona, Connecticut (as amended in 1963), Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have "intent or effect" laws, most
of which include the quoted language. Of the "intent" acts, Oklahoma, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin employ such wording. See also note 68 infra.
60. See, e.g., Perkins v. King Scoopers, 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343 (1950); Mott's Super
Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961); State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn.
504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957). But see the dissent in State v. Applebaum's Food Mkts., 259
Minn. 209, 106 N.W.2d 896 (1960) and cases cited therein. A background of mere hos-
tility between the parties does not prove illegal intent. Ellis v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234,
248 P.2d 63 (1952). See note 109 infra.
61. Trade Comm'n v. Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1951); Ellis v. Dallas, supra
note 60; Mott's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, supra note 60.
62. See State v. Applebaum's Food Mkts., 259 Minn. 209, 106 N.W.2d 896 (1960) (dis-
senting opinion). The brief of the United States (on re-argument) p. 41 in United States
v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) states: "If the seller reasonably thinks
that he is not incurring a loss on the sales, that is the end of the matter...."
63. State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957).
64. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). See also note
116 infra, where other "legitimate" sales below cost are considered.
65. State v. Applebaum's Food Mkts., 259 Minn. 209, 106 N.W.2d 896 (1960).
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divert trade, the vagueness of such standards may be constitutionally ob-
jectionable.6" Certainly if the word "unfairly" is to have any meaning,
it would seem to require some aggravating circumstances beyond mere
loss of business and may differ little from an intent to "injure" com-
petitors.6
7
As already noted, some of the acts are aimed specifically at loss
leaders. This is accomplished by mentioning them as such or including
"inducing the purchase of other merchandise" in the description of illegal
intent or effect."8 A California court held that intent was a necessary ele-
ment of a violation despite some vagueness in the act as applied to loss
leaders, while other courts have been reluctant to assume the illegality of
loss leaders as such.69 In the absence of "bait and switch" tactics, increased
markups on "other" goods,7" or other deliberately misleading methods of
advertising or merchandising below cost items, the mere fact that purchase
of other merchandise resulted should not amount to a violation.
Meeting Competition
Few of the statutes apply to transactions involving sales below cost
to meet competition.7 In most, the exemption is limited to sales made
in "good faith" to meet "legal" prices, but some acts omit the latter re-
quirement." In construing the limitation of meeting lawful prices, the
66. See Comment, 58 MIcH. L. REV. 905, 913 (1960). But see Borden Co. v. Thomason,
353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962), upholding such language where the act did not provide crim-
inal penalties.
67. Cf. State v. Walgreen, 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650 (1941); Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb.
653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949).
68. California and Washington prohibit loss leaders per se. See also note 59 supra. Colo-
rado, Oregon, and Utah aim at bait and switch tactics directly by separately prohibiting the
advertising of goods which the advertiser is not prepared to supply.
69. See Ellis v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234, 248 P.2d 63 (1952); Northern Cal. Food
Dealers, Inc. v. Farmers Mkt. of No. Cal. Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 5 68402,
at 71723 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1956); Mott's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172
A.2d 381 (1961); TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) § 68742, at 73039 (Tex. Att'y Gen.
Op. 1957); Henderson v. Hogue, TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 5 68462, at 71933
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).
70. Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S.W.2d 733 (1938) involved above normal mark-
ups on several items sold as "canning season specials" along with the loss items.
71. Only Connecticut, Rhode Island, and South Carolina do not provide this defense. Other
types of exempt transactions are considered above. Meeting competition may be a defense
due to absence of predatory intent, whether or not an exemption is expressly provided. See
p. 49 intra.
72. The Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
acts require only good faith. California, Idaho, and Washington limit the meeting competi-
tion to competitive sales in the "ordinary channels of trade," which excludes competitive
liquidation, clearance, or seasonal sales and the like. Oklahoma achieves the same result with
different wording. In Cohen v. Frey & Son, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951), the court
refused to read "lawful" into the Maryland act, although noting authority to the contrary in
interpreting the "good faith" meeting of competition defense in § 2(b) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
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decisions have tended to reject any absolute standard of lawfulness on
constitutional grounds. Rather, the courts have looked to the seller's
belief in the legality of the competing price and the reasonableness of
his reaction to it73 In such an inquiry, the timing of the defendant's cuts
in relation to competitive prices,74 the duration and amount of the re-
duction,75 the facts indicating that the illegal nature of the competing
price was apparent or readily ascertainable, and other similar considera-
tions have been relevant.7"
The defense of meeting competition is substantive. Most statutes
state that the act "does not apply" to meeting competition and other
types of exempt transactions. Furthermore, the absolute nature of the
exemptions seems to have been accepted without question by the courts.77
Thus, so long as the requirements of the exemptions are met, the statu-
tory elements of violation, such as injurious effects on competitors, do not
come into play.7" But if the requirements for exemption are not met, the
statutory elements still must be established. Failure to come within the
exemption is not equivalent to violation of the act. A seller might, for
example, "meet competition" in a business sense with extremely low
prices during a different period of time or on different goods than those
sold by his competitor. While such pricing might not come within the
"meeting competition" exemption, the sale still would be legal if lack of
predatory intent could be shown, e.g., where there had been severe price
competition and business losses to the competitor.7" However, the rela-
tionship between the exemption requirements and the elements of viola-
73. See, e.g., State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957). Acts which require
a "lawful" competitive price regardless of good faith have been held unconstitutional. State
v. Fleming, 184 Kan. 674, 339 P.2d 12 (1959); Lief v. Packard Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L.
180, 8 A.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67
(1940). Interpretations of the "good faith" requirement of § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act may be relevant, but many questions remain unresolved under that provision as well. The
many issues currently in litigation are reviewed in Robinson-Patmarn Act's Meeting Competi-
tion Defense, 96 BNA Aammusr & TRADE REG. REP. B-1 (May 14, 1963) and Current
Developments in Meeting Competition, TRADE REG. REP. 5 50171, at 55180 (1963).
74. Northern Cal. Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmers' Mkt. of No. Cal., Inc., TRADE REG. REP.
(1956 Trade Cas.) 5 68402, at 71723 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1956).
75. People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944); Sandier v. Gordon,
94 Cal. App. 2d 254, 210 P.2d 314 (1949).
76. The necessary proof of good faith is spelled out in more detail in Colorado and Min-
nesota.
77. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anderson v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034
(1949); Cohen v. Frey & Son, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1950).
78. As in the analogous situation under the meeting competition defense of § 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, injury to competition is irrelevant. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
79. State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957). See also People v. Pay
Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944); State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48 N.W.2d
460 (1951); TRADE REG. REP. (1952 Trade Cas.) 5 67410, at 68709 (Utah At'y Gen. Op.
1952). The same problem may arise outside the meeting competition area. Thus, a sale
below cost to close out an unsatisfactory line without the required advertisements, etc. would
fall outside the exemption, but the transaction would lack predatory purpose.
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tion has received little consideration, and further litigation of this issue
can be anticipated.
The extent to which one can sell merchandise below cost to meet
competition from products which differ to some degree in quality, styling,
brand name, or otherwise has not been fully developed. In spite of
restrictive statutory language, some latitude has been permitted where
the question has been raised.8" Such an approach seems likely to be
accepted to afford the small merchant an opportunity to meet private
label competition. Law review comments have suggested that a stand-
ard based on cross-elasticity of demand might be used."' However, if a
test such as cross-elasticity of demand is to be of practical significance for
the merchant, it should be used with recognition of the businessman's
need to act promptly, often with few facts and only rough business judg-
ment to guide him.
If latitude in competitive products is permitted, difficulties will then
arise as to what is "meeting" a price where the products dearly com-
pete but are different in brand name or other material respects.8 Per-
haps the only practicable approach is to evaluate the good faith of the
seller in the light of normal business standards and the reasonableness of
his response to a competitor's action in view of the usual price relation-
ship between the products. The vagueness and generality of such an
approach is preferable to arbitrary and mechanical tests which ignore
market realities or more exact techniques of economic analysis not avail-
able to the merchant at the time.
Another problem is the effect of trading stamps on the meeting
competition defense. The Safeway case 3 held that stamps were not a
matter of price, and that a competitor could not cut prices in an amount
equivalent to the value of the stamps if this put him in violation of the
statute. Safeway, however, could have given stamps so long as it did so
in approximately the same quantity as its competitor. The result seems
unfair to the concern which does not wish to employ trading stamps
80. The Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming statutes limit the defense to competitive
prices for the "same" article or product. The Idaho, Oklahoma, New Jersey, and Tennessee
statutes permit more latitude, and the remaining acts do not cover the point. In Northern
Cal. Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmers Mkt. of No. Cal. Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
3 68402, at 71723 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1956), by interpreting "same' as meaning similar rather
than identical, the court included differing brands. See also TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade
Cas.) 5 67830, at 69697 (Wis. Att'y Gen. Op. 1954).
81. See Comment, 58 MIcH. L. REV. 905, 918 (1960); Comment, 12 Sw. L.J. 482, 495
(1958).
82. For example, must a differential between brand name and private label goods be main-
tained, as the FTC has held, in cases under § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act? American
Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. Dkt. No. 8183, rev'd on other grounds, TRADE REG. REP.
70948 (7th Cit. 1963).
83. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179, af 'd, 360 U.S.
334 (1959). Other cases on the point are collected in Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1080 (1960).
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and stems from the refusal to recognize stamps as a price reduction.
Had the stamps been viewed as a price reduction, however, Safeway
still would have been unable to meet the reduction without running the
risk of having met an unlawful price.
Constitutional Validity
Constitutional attacks on the sale below cost acts have been made on
the grounds of vagueness, lack of due process, lack of relation between
the means employed and the purpose expressed, burden on interstate
commerce, interference with freedom of contract, and many others."4 The
most important constitutional questions already have been considered in
connection with particular aspects of the statutes and their interpreta-
tion.
At best, the constitutional challenges to these acts have had modest
success. The decisions are divided on the validity of the various pre-
sumptions of intent included in many of the acts. 5 Claims of unconstitu-
tional vagueness occasionally have been successful, but only in respect
to particular portions of the acts in question." More often, the courts
have sustained the statutory language, stating that a reasonable, good
faith interpretation will be sufficient, and that the statutes need not de-
fine every particular, especially if the proceeding is not penal.8 Some
success has been achieved by challen ges based on unreasonable classi
fication. Legislation containing arbitrary exclusions is more likely to be
tested in this respect in light of State v. Consumer's Warehouse Mkt."s
Objections based on burden on interstate commerce 9 and alleged cork-
flicts with federal legislation' have been given short shrift.
84. CALLmANN, TnE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKs'§ 27.3 (2d ed.
1950) gives a general survey of the constitutional problems, as does Clark, Statutory Restrkc-
lions on Selling Below Cost, 11 VAND. L REV. 105, 107 (1957). Careful consideration of
cases under the state constitution as well as the federal may be valuable. In Simonetti Inc. v.
State, 272 Ala. 398, 132 So. 2d 252 (1961), the court interpreted the Alabama cigarette act
narrowly, as required under the Alabama constitution, even though ihey conceded that the
federal constitution would permit a less restrictive view. See also Williams v. Hirsh, 211 Ga.
534, 87 S.E.2d 70 (1955).
85. See notes 57 and 58 supra.
86. See, e.g., State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650 (1941); State v
Fleming Co., 184 Kan. 674, 339 P.2d 12 (1959); State v., Consumers Warehouse Mkt. Inc.,
183 Kan. 502, 329 P.2d 638 (1958); McIntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.2d 471
(1948).
87. See, e.g., Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 141 Colo. 554, 349 P.2d
1005 (1960).
88. State v. Consumers Warehouse Mkt. Inc., 185 Kan. 363, 343 P.2d 234 (1959); see also
note 26 supra.
89. People v. Gordon, 105 Cal. App. 2d 711, 234 P.2d 287 (1951); Schwegmann Bros,
Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 114
(1959).
90. People v. Gordon, supra note 89.
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While constitutional attacks upon particular features of these acts
may be successful from time to time, it appears clear that the general
pattern of the acts is not objectionable to the courts. The Supreme
Court's decisions in the National Dairy and Safeway cases are likely to
encourage this attitude. Both opinions reflect general acceptance of the
ideas upon which the state acts are based, and the Safeway case indicates
considerable tolerance for state action in this area. On the other hand,
there is no indication that the Supreme Court approves of particular fea-
tures of these acts. The Court may well evaluate the more anticompeti-
tive aspects of the state legislation with greater awareness than some of
the state courts of its over-all relationship to antitrust policy. However,
recent rulings of state courts restricting or finding unconstitutional the
Connecticut, Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas acts may reflect an increas-
ing recognition of the inconsistency between these acts and the policy of
the Sherman Act.
Enforcement, Remedies, and Penalties
In most of the statutes, "any" person may bring an action, frequently
without regard to whether he has been directly affected by the sale below
cost.!1 Since the public interest is involved, the defense that both parties
were in pari delicto will not lie. 2 The state also may enforce these
statutes, and a few jurisdictions specifically charge a particular agency or
official with enforcement responsibility."3 In the majority of jurisdic-
tions, however, it is the attorney general or the local prosecuting at-
torney who is authorized to proceed. Relatively little state prosecution
has resulted.
The remedies under the state statutes usually are criminal as well as
civil. Criminal penalties include fines and/or imprisonment. 4 Civil
actions may be for injunctions, damages, or both. In addition, a number
of jurisdictions provide for treble damages as well.9" Several states ex-
91. Trade associations are expressly permitted to bring actions under several statutes and
presumably would be able to do so under the broad language of a number of others. Ironically,
a question arose as to whether the state could bring an injunction action under the California
act. People v. Centr-O-Mart, 34 Cal. 2d 702, 214 P.2d 378 (1950).
92. Kofsky v. Smart & Final Iris Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 530, 281 P.2d 5 (1955); Dooley's
Hardware Mart v. Does 1-10, TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70227 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1962). The latter, however, reserved the question of right to damages.
93. Montana and Utah have state "Trade Commissions," and Connecticut recently changed
its act to establish administrative proceedings before the Commissioner of Food and Drugs.
This resulted in the act being considered penal, and the presumption of intent was held un-
constitutional. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. Minnesota places investigative
responsibility with the Department of Business Development.
94. The fines are $1000 or less per violation and the imprisonment is for 6 months or less,
except in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which permits sentences up to a year. Maryland and
Nebraska have purely civil statutes. Arizona, Maine, and Oklahoma use fines only.
95. Arkansas, California (by amendment in 1959), Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
Montana, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia provide for treble damages.
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pressly provide that any contract made in violation of the law is unen-
forceable, and a few of the acts provide that corporate defendants may
lose their charter.96
In several cases, over-enthusiastic enforcement of the acts brought
charges of federal antitrust violation because of the concerted nature of
the arrangement. 7  These proceedings may have dampened interest in
the acts, since trade association enforcement based on their statistical cost
figures faces real dangers under the federal acts. Presumably, individual
firms do not wish to undertake enforcement litigation alone.
On the whole, the statutes have received relatively little use. How-
ever, uncertainty over their validity and the decisions which refuse to
permit concerted enforcement may in large part have been responsible
for this lack of activity. Furthermore, the hope for a more direct solu-
tion by means of fair trade acts undoubtedly diverted attention from the
sale below cost statutes.
As they stand, the acts create a dangerous situation whenever severe
competitive conditions result in little or no profit to the seller. Should
increased state antitrust enforcement result in reconsideration of the
possibilities of the state acts, it seems quite possible that state authorities
will be under pressure to put them to greater use where severe price
competition exists. The Supreme Court's comments with regard to sales
below cost also may arouse renewed interest in the state statutes, and, to-
gether with interpretations in other jurisdictions, suggest revised or new
legislation more effective than past attempts.
THE UNREASONABLY Low PRICE CLAUSE OF
SECTION 3 OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Although the unreasonably low price clause of section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, as interpreted in the National Dairy case, reaches
much the same target as the state acts, the approach taken is radically
different. Unlike the detailed state statutes, it simply prohibits sales
t'at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition
or eliminating a competitor. . . ."" The generality of this clause pre-
sents formidable problems of interpretation, but it also permits develop-
96. Washington, Wyoming, and the states listed in note 95 supra (except Maine) expressly
provide that contracts in violation of the act are unenforceable. Presumably the same result
might follow as a matter of general principle. Cf. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
Charter forfeiture or similar provisions are contained in the Arkansas, Hawaii, Louisiana
(wholesale or retail licenses may be revoked), Montana, South Carolina, West Virginia, and
Wyoming acts, but usually only upon a third violation.
97. The early cases and the background of the acts generally are covered at length in Com-
ment, 57 YALE Lj. 391 (1948). See also United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass'n, TRADE
REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70432 (S.D. Cal. 1962), injunction denied, TRADE REG.
REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 5 70777 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
98. Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 5 13a (1958).
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ment of interpretations more consonant with general antitrust policy
than the specific restrictions and statutory presumptions of the state laws.
The relationship of section 3 to the other federal antitrust and fair
competition laws is somewhat anomalous. It is doubtful whether section
3 adds anything to the prohibition against attempts to monopolize in the
Sherman Act,99 and the commerce requirement of section 3 is more re-
strictive.' There is no civil provision in section 2 of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act parallel to the unreasonably low price clause of section 311
Moreover, the prohibitions against discrimination in the other clauses
overlap those of section 2 in some respects, but are by no means co-
extensive."'
Virtually all of the decisions under section 3 are treble damage
cases. 03 This use of the section was ended in 1958 by the Supreme
Court's decision in Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.' 4  The lack of
government prosecutions and doubts as to constitutionality of this ad-
mittedly "vague provision"'05 then led to some feeling that the statute
was a dead letter. Now, however, the Supreme Court's ruling in the
National Dairy case may lead to re-appraisal of section 3 and renewed
interest in its potential by enforcement authorities.
99. A former chief of the antitrust division so testified in Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on the Role of Antitrust Enforcement in
Protecting Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36 (1958). See also the testimony of
the former FTC Chairman Gwynne at p. 175 of the above Hearings.
100. Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951); cf. Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309
F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) § 70796 (1963)
(Justice Black dissenting).
101. However, the FTC could proceed under section 5 of the FTC Act, 38 Stat. 717
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958). See Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
178 F. Supp. 448, 454, aff'd, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cit. 1960), cert. d&nied, 365 U.S. 877
(1961). See also the comments of former FTC Chairman Gwynne on the scope of § 5 in
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on the
Role of Antitrust Enforcement in Protecting Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1958),
and the views expressed in Hearings on H.R. 10235 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 11, 30, 79 (1960)
(Sales Below Cost).
102. See comparison in Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d
950 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960), and the analysis in ROWE, PRIc E DIS-
CRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 459-68 (1962). Particularly note-
worthy is the absence of buyer liability under § 3.
103. The only government case under the unreasonably low price clause, other than National
Dairy, is United States v. Fairmont Foods Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 5 45058,
at 66368 (W.D. Mich. 1959). A plea of guilty was entered, but sentence was suspended,
fines having been levied on Sherman Act counts based on the same conduct. There have been
only a few government prosecutions under the other clauses of § 3. See ROWE, op. cit. supra
note 102, at 468-69.
104. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 967
(1958). The Supreme Court held that § 3 was not one of the "antitrust laws" within the
meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act providing the right to private recovery. Proposals to pro-
vide a private cause of action under § 3 have been made several times since the Nashville
Milk Co. case, the latest of which are S. 1815 and S. 1935, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
105. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., supra note 104.
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The treble damage cases under the unreasonably low price clause of
section 3 did much to make the vague statutory language more mean-
ingful. Faced with the problem of distinguishing predatory conduct
from normal competitive vigor, the courts employed a rule-of-reason
approach based upon the "economic facts of life." Judge Yankwich
enumerated some of the facts bearing on the question, as follows:
"elements ... such as cost, usual profits and the like, would be avail-
able for consideration. [Other elements to consider] might be . . . the
suddenness of the price change, its relation to previous prices charged
by the merchant or by others in the field in the particular locality or
elsewhere, the existence or non-existence of new economic factors re-
lating to cost of production, demand for the article, seasonal or other,
the consequent need for expansion or contraction of the field for the
particular merchandise and other factors, financial or economic, which
might or might not warrant a precipitate reduction in price ... -106
Subsequently, in Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.' and Ben
Hur Coal Co. v. Wells,' no illegal intent was found despite evidence
of hostility between the parties and outspoken expectation by the defend-
ants that their prices would cause injurious effects to their competitors.'
The National Dairy Case
The Supreme Court held that the phrase "unreasonably low price"
was not unconstitutionally vague, since the indictment specifically
charged selling below cost. with predatory purpose, rather than relying on
the more general statutory language. Such sales, by normal standards
of the business community, were said to be clearly unreasonable, and
the court concluded that difficulty of application in the case of "marginal
offenses" need not invalidate the application of the statute in dearer
situations. Legislative history disclosed a congressional intent to prohibit
sales below cost unless "mitigated by some acceptable business exigency."
The additional element of intent to produce the result of destroying
106. F. & A. Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180, 190 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
See also Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1953),
motion to dismiss denied, 119 F. Supp. 603 (1954).
107. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd,
231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 928
(1956). The § 3 aspects of the case were not considered by the court of appeals.
108. Ben Hut Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910
(1957).
109. The district court opinion in Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp.
796, 803 (S.D. Cal. 1952), quotes testimony on the point, including the following state-
ments allegedly made by representatives of the defendant:
"'Guy, we are going to take all the profits out of ice cream.'
"Well, Guy, we've got $8,000,000.00 to spend and some of you fellows are going
to get hurt."
In the Ben Hur Coal Co. case, supra note 108, at 484, there was a background of hostility
between the parties over a period of time, and the defendant was quoted as saying that the
price cut was made "to teach him [the plaintiff) a lesson .. "
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competition was cited as aiding the weakness of the description of the
prohibited act. Taken together, these elements were found to provide
the necessary "specificity of warning."
In a dissenting opinion of only a single paragraph, Justice Black,
speaking for Justices Stewart and Goldberg, asserted that the act was
unconstitutionally vague and that only Congress could repair its inade-
quades.
Little purpose is served by detailed scrutiny of the majority's reason-
ing, analysis of authorities, or the accuracy of its interpretation of the
legislative history of section 3. The phrase "unreasonably low" does not
seem strikingly vague in an area of law where phrases of great breadth
and equally great ambiguity are basic."' However, application of the
standard of reasonableness to price, as opposed to other types of business
conduct, is disturbing because of the regulatory overtones implicit in the
concept of a "reasonable" price. In any event, the decision revitalizes an
area of law which had become virtually dormant and compels reconsider-
ation of the dangers under section 3 for clients unlucky enough to sell at
a loss or negligible profit.
The following discussion considers the elements of unreasonably low
price and predatory intent independently. The two are so closely related,
however, that the same facts often will be relevant to both. Thus, proof
of reasonable pricing may go far to disprove predatory intent and vice
versa. Nonetheless, separate analysis will indicate that there are signifi-
cant distinctions between the two elements despite the overlap and will
emphasize that both elements must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Unreasonably Low Prices
The state acts describe in detail the level of price which is forbidden
if coupled with the other elements of a violation. Under section 3, how-
ever, reasonableness is the sole guideline as to how low a price must be
to come within the statute.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in the National Dairy opinion,
like that underlying the state enactments, is that the objective of busi-
ness is to produce profits. Hence, sales without profit are unreasonable
unless a "legitimate commercial objective," a "justifying business reason,"
or an "acceptable business exigency""' is shown. The application of this
rationale to everyday business raises great difficulties. Businessmen
do not have exact knowledge of the costs attributable to particular items,
and the relationship between cost and price, particularly in highly com-
petitive markets, prevails only over the longer term."2 Except in extreme
110. The rule of reason is part of § 3, whereas it had to be read into the Sherman Act.
111. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). See p. 65 infra,
at * for current developments.
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cases or over a substantial period of time, the Supreme Court's assertion
that selling below cost has a "meaningful referrant in business practice,"
may be doubted. Apart from selling below cost, the Supreme Court
opinion gives us no guidance as to the application of section 3 or the
indicia of unreasonableness generally.
In view of the subjective standard of purpose which is required by
the statute, the word "unreasonably" should refer to an objective stand-
ard of rationality,"' i.e., the good faith exercise of ordinary business
judgment on the basis of the facts as they were or could reasonably
have been known at the time the price was set. Such an approach avoids
the unfairness and restrictive effect on price competition which would
result if the question of reasonableness turned solely on hindsight anal-
ysis of the cost-price relationship. Costs may well be an important
consideration in the evaluation of reasonableness so long as other factors
also are taken into account. It should be clear that the costs must be
actual costs of the seller, rather than a survey or what a competitor
claims to be standard or irreducible costs of the business." 4 A business-
man is sure to view his competitor's pricing as unreasonable!
As the Supreme Court indicates, the standard of reasonableness clear-
ly would permit sales below cost "such as the liquidation of excess, obso-
lete or perishable merchandise, or the need to meet a lawful, equally low
price of a competitor .... ."" More difficult problems which will have
to be considered in future cases are those involving loss operations during
start-up periods for new units or sales below cost for promotional pur-
poses, such as loss leaders, two-for-one sales, and heavy promotions of
new products." 6 The determination of reasonableness should be based
112. See Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735, 747 (Mo. 1962). Studies of pricing
practices indicate that costs are only one consideration, and then only over the long term.
See BACKmAN, PRICING: POLICIES AND PRAcTIcEs (1961) (summarizes the findings of a
number of other studies); HAYNES, PRICING DECISIONS IN SMALL BusINEss (1962). The
peculiar results of a strict cost approach to pricing are illustrated in Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
391, 396-98 (1948), and Comment, 58 MICH. L. REv., 905, 914 (1960).
113. This means rationality in terms of "legitimate commercial objectives," rather than the
elimination of competition. An irrational price due to bad judgment or inaccurate cost com-
putation might be unreasonably low, but would be lacking in predatory intent. See note 62
supra and note 116 infra.
114. Although several state acts specifically provide that cost surveys are "competent evi-
dence," there is no such provision in § 3, and federal authorities appear to oppose such an
approach. Surveys are expressly excluded in the Trade Practice Rules for the Slide Fastener
Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 193 (1960), and use of surveys often has been a basic part of the
concerted enforcement efforts which have been held illegal under the Sherman Act. See note
97 supra.
115. These categories dearly are not exclusive of others. Compare the exemptions provided
by the state acts, p. 40 supra. The reference to meeting a "lawful" price is considered further
below.
116. Lawful sales below cost were considered in the briefs of the United States and of Na-
tional Dairy on re-argument in United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29
(1963). The Brief for United States on Reargument, pp. 41-42 commented: "To be sure,
there are special situations in which sales below cost have a legitimate commercial justification.
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upon analysis of the duration and timing of promotional sales below
cost; whether a new product is being promoted or entry into a new
market attempted; the amount of loss in relation to reasonable expecta-
tions of future volume; profitability; and the like." 7
If, as the National Dairy case suggests, profitless prices are unreason-
able (absent "legitimate commercial objectives"), then, conversely, pro-
fitable prices are reasonable and there should be little occasion for the
use of section 3 outside the area of sales below cost. A merchant's de-
cision to accept a slim profit should not be tampered with in anything
but a most unusual and extreme case. Even if the seller's motives are
predatory, the use of low but somewhat profitable prices should not be
considered unreasonable, except where the price is so low as to make the
profit absurd in relation to the investment and obviously unacceptable
in the long term. Such prices also may be timed to particularly disadvan-
tage a competitor or applied to a product of great importance to him, but
of less significance to the originator of the price. Perhaps in such cases
section 3 should apply and the price should be found unreasonable
despite the nominal profit. But as more profit is involved, application of
section 3 will involve the courts in determining the reasonableness of
profits rather than in punishing predatory conduct.
Application of section 3 to vertically integrated companies may
create difficulty, particularly where the computation and allocation of
The price fixed by competition in the sale of the product may be below the costs of the par-
ticular firm. Sales below cost may dispose of excess inventory, of obsolete or spoiling mer-
chandise, or of merchandise in a line which the seller no longer wishes to produce or distribute;
they may be made to introduce a new product or to break into a new market; or they may be
designed to retain a customer by meeting in good faith the equally low price of a competitor.
Under certain conditions a business firm might reasonably drop its price below its unit costs
at the current volume of sales in the belief that the volume of sales could be so greatly in-
creased as to reduce the unit price and secure a larger total profit. A firm might sell a by-
product or carry a minor line priced at less than its fully distributed costs where this would
increase its net income from all sales. Other explanations may be rational in the circumstances
of a particular case. .. ." (Emphasis added).
National Dairy quarreled with the government's characterization of these instances as
"special situations" and also added sales below cost due to overestimates of volume or unan-
ticipated increases in cost, sales for the convenience of customers who chiefly buy other prod-
ucts, promotional sales generally, sales below cost due to lack of knowledge of unit cost, and
some variations on sales below cost to meet competition. Brief for Appellees on Reargument,
pp. 35-36, United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., supra.
117. Although something of a cause celebre for small business from the testimony offered
before Congressional committees (see, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10235 Before the Subcommittee
on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 66, 75 (1960), and H.R. REP. No. 566, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963)
(quality stabilization)), the courts have been reluctant to find loss leaders illegal even under
the state acts which specifically apply to them. See note 69 supra. Since loss leaders are
selective, they would seem to be an effective form of competition tailored for small concerns.
"Bait and switch" tactics and other deceptive uses of loss leaders are covered, of course,
by § 5 of the FTC Act. See the FTC's "Guides Against Bait Advertising," 24 Fed. Reg. 9755
(1959).
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costs are concerned.118 It may be argued that reasonableness should be
judged in the context of the particular functional level at which the chal-
lenged sale occurred. The wording of section 3, however, affords no
basis for such an interpretation. Aggregating all costs attributable to the
sale seems preferable from a policy viewpoint, so that a seller's willing-
ness to accept a lower overall return on investment and pass on cost sav-
ings resulting from integration will not be denied to the consumer. Such
an approach need not prevent application of section 3 to predatory
pricing aimed at competitors at one level, but rather requires full evalua-
tion of the setting as opposed to giving undue weight to the particular
level of operation." 9
If section 3 is to be employed in harmony with overall antitrust
policy, full recognition must be given to the many factors which bear on
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a price. Unreasonableness is
an independent and essential element of violation;.2 ° and even though
cost may have an important bearing on the question of unreasonableness,
it must be considered along with the many other influences on prices. In
highly competitive markets, sales below cost may not be unusual or avoid-
able.' Evaluation of reasonableness under such conditions should take
into account the stress and strain of vigorous competition and the uncon-
trollable downward pressure on prices which normal competitive forces
generate from time to time.
Intent to Destroy Competition or Eliminate a Competitor
Although the element of intent already had been explored in the
treble damage cases, the Supreme Court's citation of the Ben Hur case,
and its recognition that the required intent is "specific" and "predatory"
118. See p. 49 supra, regarding the treatment of integrated businesses under the state acts.
119. Where goods are sold at different levels, the possibility of a "squeeze" arises. For
example, a wholesaler who buys from an integrated company which also sells at wholesale in
competition with the customer is "squeezed" if the integrated company cuts prices to retailers
but not to wholesalers. The economics of this theory have been challenged. Bork, Vertical
Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of the Antitrust Laws Upon
Combinations of Successive Stages of Production and Distribution, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
921 (1949). See also note 51 supra. Nonetheless, small business dearly views the "squeeze"
as a major problem. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Select Committee
on Small Business on The Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and Related
Vertical Integration, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). While the effect on competitors in such
cases may bear on the reasonableness and the purpose of the price change, it should not be
assumed that integrated companies control prices at any level or are happy to invest in dis-
tribution functions with little or no compensation, although that is precisely the accusation!
120. The relationship between the requirements of unreasonableness and predatory intent
is considered at pp. 60-61 infra.
121. Predatory purpose may be lacking where low prices are due to competitive forces. As
noted below, however, the heat of the moment may lead to extreme statements by employees
which are difficult to explain at a later time.
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and that the conduct must be "designed to destroy competition"'22 lends
weight to the earlier interpretations.
Some confusion is created, however, by the Court's reference to meet-
ing "lawful" competitive prices. The Court notes that a price set to meet
such competition would be neither unreasonable nor made with preda-
tory intent. It is difficult, however, to see how a purely defensive price
can be unreasonable even if the competitive price is unlawful. '2 It is
even more artificial to claim that such a defensive price is indicative of an
intent to destroy competition or eliminate a competitor. Unlike the state
acts 24 and section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, meeting competi-
tion is not an affirmative defense or a specific exemption under the stat-
ute. Under section 3, meeting competition is relevant only to show
the absence of the statutory elements of unreasonable price and predatory
purpose. There is no basis in the statute for bringing in the restrictions
contained in section 2 (b) 2 or those considered implicit in it; and to do
so would lead to extreme difficulties of interpretation. 26 Would "law-
ful" refer to section 3 alone, or also to section 2? Under section 3, the
reasonableness of the competitive price turns on considerations of cost
and the overall circumstances of the competitor. The seller is unlikely
to have adequate knowledge of these factors, but even if the competitor's
price is clearly unreasonable, how is the seller to ascertain the intent
behind it?
Despite the comments in the National Dairy case and the more de-
tailed analysis in the earlier treble damage cases, the nature of the intent
required by section 3 has not been defined in specific terms. The
line between normal competitive hostility and predatory purpose is more
a question of degree than of basic difference. Mere overstatements of a
participant in a vigorous competitive struggle may be difficult to explain
at a later time, especially when the employee or executive may no longer
be available. In weighing colorful statements by overzealous em-
ployees, courts should consider the extent of their pricing authority, the
122. Except when reciting the full language of the statute, the Supreme Court referred to
"destroying competition." However, even under § 2(a) (which lacks the phrase "eliminat-
ing a competitor" and refers only to "competition") it is recognized that predatory prices to
eliminate individual concerns are illegal. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Breads Co., 348
U.S. 115 (1954), and the review of predatory price cases under § 2(a) in Keck, Lawful Price
Discrimination: "Where There Is No Unlawful Effect on Competition," 8 ANTITRuST BULL.
381, 400-01 (1963).
123. "One who reduces his prices in defense of his economic life cannot be guilty of elimi-
nating competition or his competitors." Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 486 (10th
Cir. 1957).
124. See p. 48 supra, regarding meeting competition under the state acts; see also pp. 49-50
supra for discussion of the relationship of the specific exemptions provided by the state acts
to the elements of intent or effect required by them.
125. The legislative history of § 3 in this respect is summarized in RowE, PRICE DisCRIM-
INATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 456-57 (1962).
126. See note 73 supra in regard to the problems under § 2(b).
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timing and circumstances of their comments in relation to the price
change, and the likelihood that their words were to be taken literally.12
The Ben Hur and Balian Ice Cream Co. cases indicate that this approach
will be taken, but counsel should not rely upon freedom from predatory
intent too readily. Although the burden to show anticompetitive motives
lies with the government, the possibility that improper comments by em-
ployees, documentary or verbal, may come to light should not be under-
estimated. However unwarranted, evidence of this type will be difficult
to meet in the absence of contemporary documents providing a positive
explanation of the true background and motivation for the price move,
particularly when there is a considerable lapse of time before the claim
of a section 3 violation.
Although section 3 provides no presumptions of intent, such as
those in the state acts, it is inevitable that severe price reductions will be
more difficult to explain. However, the relationship between predatory
intent and unreasonable prices has received little attention in the cases.
The opinion in National Dairy notes the absence of both elements in the
examples of lawful sales below cost, but that should not obscure the fact
that absence of either is a complete defense. The language of the act ex-
pressly requires proof of both anticompetitive purpose and unreasonable
prices, and the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the element of intent
as relieving the vagueness of the phrase "unreasonably low prices." The
earlier treble damage cases also make it clear that an extremely low
price, even if below cost, does not establish a violation in the absence of
an unlawful purpose.' Conversely, ruthless and aggressive competitors
are not in violation of the act if their pricing is reasonable, regardless of
their motive. Care should be exercised to prevent unpleasant motives
or personal antagonisms from influencing the analysis of reasonableness
and vice versa.
In the debates over section 3, Congressman Patman argued that
the requirement of intent would be difficult to meet;129 but it remained
in the statute. The National Dairy opinion makes it dear that the ex-
press requirement of intent cannot be ignored or satisfied with less than
a showing of deliberate anticompetitive motives. As a policy matter, the
requirement of intent is important, since a defense based on the fact that
the price was reasonable is difficult and uncertain whenever prices enter
127. Examples of the problems of ensuring that employees adhere to company policy in such
matters are illustrated in United States v. New York Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626, 667-68 (E.D. Ill. 1946), afj'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
128. "And, to recover under this provision of Section 3, prices must not only be unreasonably
low, but they must also have been established with the design and purpose to destroy com-
petition." Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 483 (10th Cir. 1957). "Cutting prices
is not per se unlawful and will not supply the intent which this court must find... Hershel
Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
129. 80 CONG. REc. 8227 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Patman).
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the area in which full cost coverage is doubtful. Businessmen would be
required to enter this no-man's land under the peril of criminal penalties
if not for the requirement of predatory purpose.
THE STATE ACTS AND SECTION 3 IN RELATION TO
ANTITRUST POLICY
Both section 3 and the state sale-below-cost acts have been vig-
orously criticized for their vagueness and impracticality in terms of
business realities and, more basically, for their conflict with antitrust
policy.' Analysis of the policy considerations, however, is hampered
by lack of adequate factual information concerning many of the alleged
evils to which this legislation is directed. Much is said of "loss leaders"
and "selling below cost" in the congressional hearings, but little factual
detail emerges. It is apparent that the witnesses are often making as-
sumptions based on their own costs or do not really mean that a loss
is involved. If more data were available on such areas as: (1) the fre-
quency with which intentional selling at a loss occurs; (2) who uses
such pricing techniques and why; and (3) whether or not consumers
are misled by such practices, a more rational evaluation of the need
for state or federal legislation could be attempted.' At present, how-
ever, the issue is clouded by general denunciations of "bad bigness," with
little concrete supporting evidence. 2
Three policy objectives are said to be served by restricting low prices:
(1) protection of the consumer against misrepresentation and deception;
(2) protection of the vigor of competition by limiting the use of size
and strength as such to eliminate the small; and (3) protection of the
plane of competition by outlawing unfair tactics. The latter two, of
course, are virtually inseparable, but independent consideration of them
may help to clarify the issues.
The deception of consumers through the use of loss leaders is often
said to arise from the shopper assuming that the advertised bargain is
130. As to the state acts, see, e.g., Clark, Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below Cost, 11
VAND. L. REV. 105 (1957); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 391 (1948); cf. 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS § 27 (2d ed. 1950). As to § 3, see EDWARDS, THE PRICE
DISCRIMINATION LAw 645 (1959); ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 452 (1962); Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 285 (1954); cf. Rose, The
Right of a Businessman to Lower the Price of His Goods, 4 VAND. L. REV. 221 (1951).
131. Earlier studies of the use of loss leaders are summarized in Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
391, 394 n.12 & 398 n.26 (1948). See also note 139 infra.
132. See, e.g., Dixon, Significant New Commission Developments, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION REP. 247, 253 (1962); The Federal Trade Commission in 1962, 1963 N.Y.S.B.A.
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 31, where Chairman Dixon refers to use of ". .. the brute
power of a long purse to take another man's economic life." Claims of predatory pricing
appear regularly in testimony before Congressional committees, such as the hearings cited
elsewhere in this article.
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representative of the prices on other merchandise in the store."3  The
loss leader, however, is likely to be featured as a "special," available for
a limited time only, and as such, set apart from the normal prices on
other merchandise in the store. Whether shoppers assume that the
store offers other values comparable to that of the "leader" does not
seem to have been tested or studied. In any event, there still will be
low priced specials, even though at or above cost. Elimination of selling
below cost can, at best, only narrow the price difference between "spe-
cials" and other goods at normal prices.
It is argued that a more general deception is practiced upon the
public - that the consumer is deceived as to quality and deprived of
service by the discount operator. If such is the case, and such merchan-
disers continue to flourish notwithstanding their abuse of the public, the
problem goes beyond the use of loss leaders and sales below cost. If,
over a substantial period, the majority of consumers can be so misled, it
is difficult to conceive of any adequate protective legislation which is
consistent with free marketing and pricing. However, the recent failure
or financial distress of some of the discount chains may indicate that the
public is becoming somewhat disenchanted with discount operations after
experience with them.
There are, of course, dearly objectionable techniques, such as adver-
tising brand name products and then switching the customers brought
in by this lure to other goods. Conduct of this nature is amenable to
direct action upon the misrepresentation itself,' rather than limiting
price freedom generally and eliminating or restricting the "bargain"
which the alert shopper can obtain by purchasing loss leaders which are
offered more freely. More subtle variations of the "bait and switch"
may present an enforcement problem, as do any of the more astute forms
of misrepresentation. There seems little reason, however, to assume
that limitation on the use of sales below cost will be a better weapon
against the sophisticated operator than a more direct approach; whereas
the loss to the consumer and the policy objections against any limitation
on price freedom obviously are far greater.
Restrictions on selling below cost or at unreasonably low prices seem
of questionable value as a protection against loss of competitive vigor
through the elimination of competitors. Here again, other more direct
approaches are available. Predatory price cutting in particular areas is
within the scope of the other provisions of section 3 as well as sec-
133. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10235 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1960). But see Comment, 58
Mca I REv. 905, 913 (1960).
134. See the FTC's "Guides Against Bait Advertising," 24 Fed. Reg. 9755 (1959).
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tion 2(a). Beyond that, deliberately anticompetitive pricing tactics are
subject to the Sherman and the Federal Trade Commission Acts.' 35
The assumption that predatory price cutting is a widespread and
effective method to eliminate competition also seems questionable. On
analysis, it seems obvious that local price cutting can only be successful
where there are no other strong competitors 3 ' - a situation which
must be somewhat unusual in an era of highly mobile shoppers respon-
sive to advertising media covering wide areas. In most cases, the real
problem may be that the vigor of competition among the larger con-
cerns results in adverse effects on the independents. It seems probable
that the large merchandisers often may buy at better prices and enjoy
economies of distribution, promotional and advertising know-how, and
other advantages which independent distributors are likely to have diffi-
culty meeting. Nonetheless, the rumors of the imminent death of small
business seem exaggerated," 7 and the vigor of competition in distribution
businesses in general would seem to be greater today than ever.
But whether or not the vigorous struggle between chain, "discount,"
and department stores, indicates that the vitality of competition is not
endangered, it is scarcely surprising that independent businesses, many
of them substantial, long established, and well regarded, view the situa-
tion as an "unfair" threat to their survival. However, the elimination
of selling below cost or at unreasonably low prices does not seem to offer
a solution to the difficulty of the independents in the present merchan-
dising struggle. The unfairness, if it is such, appears to be far more
basic than the use of loss leaders or local price cutting. It lies in the
public's acceptance, knowledgeable or otherwise, of volume, self-service
merchandising in exchange for lower prices. Whether independents can
meet this demand is not clear. But the elimination of sales below cost
does not seem to offer much hope as a solution so long as the public
moves away from the traditional channels of distribution and the com-
plex of values other than price offered by traditional merchandising
techniques.
135. See notes 99 and 101 supra in regard to the relationship between § 3 and the Sherman
and FTC Acts. The need for criminal penalties in this area has been questioned, and in
any event the provisions of § 3 should be made consistent with § 2. See EDwARDs, THE PRICE
DISciMiNATION LAw 645-46 (1959). A number of states also have price discrimination
acts and general antitrust acts which might be used against predatory pricing tactics.
136. See Adelman, Geographical Price Differentials, An Economic Commentary, 48 ILL.
B.J. 514, 518-19 (1960). The unreasonably low price clause of § 3 and the state acts are
not, of course, limited to discriminatory local price cutting. However, the argument that
profits from other areas can be used to subsidize price cutting to eliminate local competitors
is also adapted to vertically integrated companies, i.e., manufacturing profits may be used to
subsidize the distribution operations of integrated concerns. The economics of this view have
been criticized. See Adelman, Integration and the Antitrust Laws, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27
(1949). See also note 119 sapra on the related "squeeze" theory.
137. See Report of the White House Committee on Small Business (1962), reprinted in
7 ANTITRUsT BuLL. 645, 662 (1962).
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Even if the desirability of some form of legislation is assumed, the
practical objections to the method employed are great The assumptions
that businessmen have detailed knowledge of the costs of particular
items and that they use such cost data as a controlling basis for setting
prices has little basis in fact. 8 And the effect of strict enforcement of
both state and federal acts based on such assumptions is likely to be a
substantial restriction upon price freedom. Lacking knowledge of exact
costs, businessmen faced with criminal penalties will be reluctant to
reduce prices into the area of doubtful cost coverage. Obviously the loss
of price freedom may become more serious under acts which apply to
manufacturers as well as distributors, employ presumptions of illegal
intent and the cost of doing business, define effects in terms of diverting
trade, and restrict meeting-competition and other exemptions.
When all is said and done, the fact is that a great deal of legislation
restricting low prices is already on the books and there is little hope that
it will be repealed or substantially modified. There are many unre-
solved questions of interpretation, however, particularly under the un-
reasonably low price clause of section 3. It is hoped that the courts
will approach these issues with full awareness of the delicate judicial
surgery required to locate and excise the malignancy of predatory prices
without killing or crippling price competition itself."8 9
138. See note 112 supra. Small businesses would be ill equipped to prove their costs and
unable to afford expert analysis and testimony. In the Hearings on H.R. 10235 Before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 57 (1960), a spokesman for the National Small Business Association testified that the
proposed federal legislation, which would have utilized the cost definitions contained in the
state acts, was particularly unworkable for small businesses because the owners of such busi-
nesses simply take whatever salary they can and thus have a fluctuating cost.
139. A new study of the problem of price warfare concludes that "peace at any price may
be just as unacceptable in the market place as it is in international relations." CASSADY,
PRIcE WARFARE IN BusINESS COMPETITION: A STUDY OF ABNORMAL COMPETITIVE BE-
HA IOR 75 (1963).
0 National Dairy subsequently was convicted by a jury in the District Court for Western
Aissouri, 110 B.NA ANTlTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-17 (Aug. 20, 1963). There is no
report, as yet, of the penalties assessed. Earlier, the court ruled that evidence of the size and
financial resources of National Dairy was admissible, though imposing some limitations upon
the government's reference to such matter in argument. United States v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 9 70869, at 78508 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
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